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SQUEEZES IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE
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I. INTRODUCTION

Substantial progress has been made toward greater harmonization of competition law,1 from both a procedural and a substantive perspective, among the
more than 150 national or supra-national jurisdictions around the world that
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As a result, in part, of the efforts of the International Competition Network (ICN) (at http://
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) (at http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34685_
1_1_1_1_1,00.html).

# The Author (2012). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com

Downloaded from http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/ at Cornell University Library on February 13, 2013

ABSTRACT
Notwithstanding assertions of greater harmonization and convergence between
U.S. and EU competition law, recent case law has identified significant differences in those jurisdictions’ approaches to the regulation of a price or margin
squeeze. In the United States after linkLine, the likelihood of a successful claim
has been significantly diminished, particularly if there has been no prior course
of voluntary dealing and no downstream predatory pricing. In contrast, in a
series of decisions in liberalized telecommunications markets, the EU courts,
in applying an “as efficient competitor test,” have focused on the preservation
of competitive rivalry as “equality of opportunity.” This significantly broadens
the potential liability for a margin squeeze in the European Union and reconstitutes EU competition law as a form of de facto regulation in liberalized
markets. Faced with the uncertainty of this standard, the dominant firm has an
incentive to avoid liability by raising its retail prices to the detriment of consumers. This article evaluates this divergence in the approach to the regulation of
a price or margin squeeze in the United States and the European Union and
traces these approaches to differing conceptions of dominant firm regulation,
which in turn have informed different understandings of the regulation of a
refusal to supply and the intersection of competition law with sector-specific
regulation.
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A representative collection of writings on U.S. and EU competition law cooperation and
cartel enforcement is found in issue 1 of 10 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L (2011), available at
http://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/oct-11/.
This is reflected in a string of Supreme Court (and lower court opinions): Brooke Group
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 U.S. 209 (1993); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons
Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns Inc., 555 U.S. 438
(2009). Christine Varney, recent head of the Antitrust Division, has suggested that concerns
about “false positives” or excessive deterrence are overblown. Christine Varney, Vigorous
Antitrust Enforcement In This Challenging Era, Remarks as Prepared for the Center for
American Progress (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/
245711.htm.
See Case C-95/04 P, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331; Case C-202/07 P,
France Télécom SA v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. I-2369; Judgment of the Court (Second
Chamber) of 14 October 2010–Deutsche Telekom AG v. European Commission, Vodafone D2
GmbH, formerly Vodafone AG & Co. KG, formerly Arcor AG & Co. KG and Others (Case
C-280/08 P), 2010 O.J. (C 346) 4 [hereinafter Deutsche Telekom 2010]; Case C-52/09,
Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42 (Feb. 17, 2011).
In announcing the review of Article 102 TFEU, Philip Lowe, then EC Director General of
Competition, stated “[a] credible policy on abusive conduct must be compatible with
mainstream economics.” Philip Lowe, Speech by the Director-General of DG Competition,
Fordham Corporate Law Institute 30th Annual Conference on Int’l Antitrust Law & Pol’y 2
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maintain some kind of competition law regime, including most notably the
United States and the European Union. On the procedural side, there are
numerous examples of cooperation agreements; on the substantive side, a
widespread consensus has emerged that a very aggressive prosecution of
cartels, especially of the international variety, is an economically and politically appropriate attitude.2
One area that has been slower to advance toward harmonization has been
the law and policy regarding dominant firms. The U.S. courts have almost
completely abandoned the notion that antitrust law exists in part to protect
competitors against aggressive competition from their larger and often more
efficient rivals, towards a consumer-welfare model that punishes such competition only if it threatens to lead to higher prices for consumers. Even
then, it bends over backwards to avoid “false positives” that might act to
deter large firms from engaging in aggressive but legitimate competition
out of fear of being caught in a government enforcement web and private
treble damage actions.3 Yet many have perceived a historical reluctance of
the European Union to give up the notion that competition law can and
should be used to protect smaller firms from aggressive competition from
larger rivals, even when there is little likelihood of long-term harm to
consumers.4
Recently, however, the European Commission has signaled a desire to
move towards a “more economic,” “effects based,” and “consumer welfare”
assessment of exclusionary abuses by dominant undertakings under Article
102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (formerly Article 82 of the EC Treaty).5 Many have viewed this as evidencing
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(Oct. 23, 2003). See also Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy (EAGCP), An
Economic Approach to Article 82 (July 2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/
economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf; Eur. Comm’n, Guidance on the Commission’s
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 [Article 102] of the EC Treaty to Abusive
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, 9 } 19 (EC)
[hereinafter Guidance on Article 102].
6
In her opinion in the British Airways appeal, Advocate General Kokott pointed out: “[a]ny
reorientation in the application of Article 82 EC can be of relevance only for the future, not
for the legal assessment of a decision already taken.” Opinion of A-G Kokott, Case C-95/04
P, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, } 28. See also Ariel Ezrachi, The
Commissions’ Guidance on Article 82 EC and the Effects Based Approach—Legal and Practical
Challenges, in ARTICLE 82 EC: REFLECTIONS ON ITS RECENT EVOLUTION (Ariel Ezrachi ed.,
Hart Publ’g 2009).
7
linkLine, 555 U.S. 438.
8
Deutsche Telekom 2010, supra note 4.
9
TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42.
10
“Price squeeze” is the term more commonly used by courts and commentators in the
United States, and “margin squeeze” is more common in the European Union. The terms
have identical meanings, and reference will be made to both throughout this article.
11
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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an increasing convergence with the approach to monopolization in the
United States under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The European courts,
however, have maintained a distinctly different interpretation to that developed in the United States.6 The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Pacific Bell
Telephone v. linkLine Communications 7 and the European Court of Justice’s
decisions in Deutsche Telekom AG v. European Commission 8 and
Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige 9 offer clear illustrations of these differing approaches in the context of the regulation of a “price squeeze,” or
“margin squeeze.”10 In the United States after linkLine, the likelihood of a
successful price squeeze suit has been significantly diminished. Price
squeezes have traditionally been treated as a variant of a “constructive
refusal to deal,” but the viability of refusal to deal cases, except possibly in
very limited circumstances, has been cast into doubt by the Supreme Court
decisions in Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko 11 and
now linkLine. In contrast, in a series of decisions in liberalized telecommunications markets, the EU courts have separated the margin squeeze inquiry
from a “constructive refusal to supply.” This significantly broadens the
scope of potential liability for a margin squeeze in the European Union, particularly in non-regulated industries, increasing the likelihood of false positives and the distortion of investment incentives.
This divergence has most commonly been traced to differing conceptions
of the purposes of dominant firm regulation, which in turn have informed
different approaches to the regulation of a “refusal to supply” and the intersection of antitrust with sector-specific regulation. The EU seems attracted
to the notion of preserving “equality of opportunity” for smaller firms to
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compete against their dominant rivals. A problem with this focus, however,
is that “equality of opportunity” translates neither into an exclusionary
purpose nor into consumer detriment.
As a group of U.S. antitrust professors and scholars, headed by Robert
Bork and Gregory Sidak, stated in their amicus curiae brief to the U.S.
Supreme Court in the linkLine appeal from the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals (“Amicus Brief”):

For such eminent U.S. antitrust academics to highlight these differences in
an amicus brief is, in itself, quite remarkable and is clear evidence of the importance they attach to this issue.
This article examines the regulation of a price or margin squeeze in the
United States and the European Union and argues that there is some basis
for the claim in the Amicus Brief of the “consumer welfare” versus the
“welfare of competitors” characterization of the differences in approach.

II. A PRICE SQUEEZE AS A “CONSTRUCTIVE REFUSAL TO SUPPLY”
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT

A price squeeze typically arises in an industry where a vertically integrated
dominant supplier prices wholesale access to a network or an input vital to
the sale or manufacture of a downstream product or service at such a level
that the downstream competitor of the dominant firm cannot purchase the
input at that price and compete with the downstream retail arm of the vertically integrated firm. This pricing of the input has the effect of raising rivals’
costs and forcing competitors out of the downstream market.13
12

13

Brief of Amici Curiae Professors and Scholars in Law and Economics in support of the
Petitioners at 5, Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, 555 U.S. 438 (2009) (No.
07-512), 2007 WL 4132899 [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. See also J. Gregory Sidak, Abolishing
the Price Squeeze as a Theory of Antitrust Liability, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 279, 295
(2008); Declaración de Economistas y Especialistas en Legislación Antimonopólica en
Representación de Radiomóvil Dipsa, S.A. de C.V. (Telcel) [Declaration of Economists and
Antitrust Scholars on Behalf of Radiomóvil Dipsa S.A. de C.V. (Telcel)], Recurso de
Reconsideración, RA-007-2011, Expediente del asunto n.8 DE-37-2006 (filed Oct. 14,
2011) [hereinafter Telcel Declaration of Economists].
See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’
Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); Steven C. Salop, Refusal to Deal
and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertically Integrated Monopolist, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 709
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The alternative to consumer-welfare maximization is the view that antitrust law is simply
one more tool of industrial policy, and thus its application may permissibly compromise
consumer welfare to advance the welfare of competitors. Other nations evidently consider
this normative proposition to be appropriate, if recent developments in the European
Union are a valid indication. More than ever before, the United States and Europe
appear to be at a fork in the road over whether the law of monopolization exists to
protect consumers or to ensure that a specified number of firms will profitably populate
a market.12
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14

15
16
17

18
19
20

(2010); Dennis W. Carlton, Should “Price Squeeze” Be a Recognised Form of Anticompetitive
Conduct?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 271 (2008).
The test to be applied for monopolization under section 2 was established by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). That is, the possession of
monopoly power in the relevant market and “the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.” Id. at 570-71.
250 U.S. 300 (1919).
Id. at 307.
Later in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), the Court specifically
referred to the above-quoted passage in Colgate and found the refusal to accept local
advertising (presumably at the paper’s standard rates) from parties that also used a
competitor for local advertising was unlawful as an attempt to monopolize. In Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S 366 (1973), the defendant’s refusal to sell power at
wholesale rates (set by a federal regulator) was unlawful because it represented a use of the
defendant’s dominance to foreclose potential competition with itself at the retail level.
472 U.S. 585 (1985).
540 U.S. 398 (2004).
The United States Supreme Court stated:
In any business, patterns of distribution develop over time; these may reasonably be
thought to be more efficient than alternative patterns of distribution that do not
develop. The patterns that do develop and persist we may call the optimal patterns. By
disturbing optimal distribution patterns one rival can impose costs upon another, that
is, force the other to accept higher costs.
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In the United States, a price squeeze was regarded as a “constructive
refusal to deal” and developed against the background of the law on “refusals
to deal” under section 2 of the Sherman Act.14 The classic duty to deal doctrine was established in United States v. Colgate & Company,15 where the
Supreme Court stated that, in the “absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader
or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.”16 The
Court suggested that, where such a purpose exists, there may exist a duty to
deal, although the opinion is silent on the terms of such a duty.17
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Ski Corporation 18 and Trinko 19 have significantly reduced the circumstances where a duty to deal will be established under section 2, particularly in regulated industries and/or where there has been no previous course
of dealing. These decisions were then relied on by the Court in linkLine to
reject the price squeeze (constructive refusal to supply) claim.
In Aspen, the Supreme Court found that it was possible for a jury to infer
that the dominant ski company’s refusal to continue a joint venture with a
rival was anticompetitive. The change in pattern of behavior or withdrawal
from the scheme was seen as arguably contrary to the profit-maximizing
interests of the monopolist.20 The Court approved a jury instruction that the
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at or near the outer boundary of [section] 2 liability. The Court there found significance
in the defendant’s decision to cease participation in a cooperative venture. The unilateral
termination of a voluntary (and thus presumably profitable) course of dealing suggested a
willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.21

The termination of the agreement in Aspen therefore formed a plausible
basis for the jury’s inference that the defendant had no legitimate business
reason for continuing the cooperation: “[s]imilarly, the [Aspen] defendant’s
unwillingness to renew the ticket prices even if compensated at retail price
revealed a distinctly anticompetitive bent.”22
The Supreme Court placed a great deal of emphasis on the absence of a
prior supply agreement. Since the defendant (Verizon) in Trinko had never
previously sold to the entity seeking cooperation (AT&T),23 there would be
no basis such as that in Aspen for any inference that the refusal was not motivated by legitimate business reasons. The Court notes that the complaint
failed to allege that
Verizon voluntarily engaged in a course of dealing with its rivals, or would ever have
done so absent statutory compulsion. Here, therefore, the defendant’s prior conduct
sheds no light upon the motivation of its refusal to deal—upon whether its regulatory
lapses were prompted not by competitive zeal but by anticompetitive malice.24

21
22
23

24

472 U.S. at 604 (1985) (citing ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF 156 (Basic Books 1978)).
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
Id. (emphasis in original).
At the time of the Trinko decision, AT&T, on account of its divestiture in 1984, was
primarily involved in the long distance telephone market and did not operate as an ILEC. By
the time of the linkLine decision, it had been acquired by SBC (in 2005), an ILEC (and
former “Baby Bell,” Southwestern Bell Corporation). The merged entity adopted the AT&T
name.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
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refusal to deal would not be a violation if a valid business reason existed for
that refusal. In the view of the Court, the defendant’s conduct seemed to be
without any valid business reason, but the Court did not elaborate on what
would count as a valid business reason and did not provide any detail as to
the terms on which the defendant would be required to deal, possibly permitting the inference that the defendant had to continue to deal on the same
terms it had dealt with the plaintiff in the past. Therefore, the Court left
open the question of the existence and terms of any duty to deal had there
been no prior course of dealing.
In Trinko, it was claimed that Verizon, the incumbent local exchange
carrier (LEC), provided insufficient assistance in the provision of telecommunication services to rivals in a market regulated by a federal and state
statutory access regime. The Supreme Court described Aspen as:
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A. The Classic U.S. Price Squeeze Decisions
Although the terminology “price squeeze” does not appear in the judgment,
the first price squeeze scenario under section 2 of the Sherman Act was in
Eastman Kodak Company of New York v. Southern Photo Materials Company.28
The defendant, allegedly seeking to control the retail market as well as the
wholesale market, discontinued selling to the plaintiff at the dealers’ discount and would sell only at retail prices, making it impossible for the plaintiff to compete with the defendant for retail sales. The Supreme Court held
that the defendant’s refusal to continue to sell to the plaintiff at the dealers’
discount could be an actionable wrong if it is in furtherance of a purpose to
monopolize.
The classic formulation of liability for a price squeeze is that put forward
by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.29
Alcoa was charged with using its monopoly power in the upstream aluminum ingot market to squeeze the profits of rivals in downstream aluminum
sheet manufacturing. The Court generally endorsed the plaintiff ’s theory
that Alcoa
consistently sold ingot at so high a price that the “sheet rollers,” who were forced to buy
from it, could not pay the expenses of “rolling” the “sheet” and make a living profit out
of the price at which “Alcoa” itself sold “sheet”. . . . That it was unlawful to set the price
25
26

27

28
29

Id. at 410.
Id. at 409. In In re Elevator Antitrust Litigation, 502 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 2007), the Court of
Appeals adopted the view that Trinko created a safe harbor for firms with no prior course of
dealing or cooperating with rivals.
The Court did not discuss the potential evidentiary burden in trying to decide whether a
proffered price is a genuine profit-maximizing monopoly price or something more, intended
to function as a “constructive refusal to deal.”
273 U.S. 359 (1927).
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Moreover, Verizon was not free to set the terms of any cooperation, because
the terms of dealing were effectively dictated by regulation. This undermined another basis for any assertion that cooperation would have been
profitable for Verizon (and therefore that the refusal to cooperate could not
have been for a legitimate business reason).
The question remains: does this reflect simply a failure in the pleadings
that future plaintiffs could easily remedy, or is the Court setting up a “safe
harbor” for defendants that have never sold at arms’ length, in that “the services allegedly withheld are not otherwise marketed or available to the
public,”25 or otherwise cooperated with competitors?26 It is significant that
the Court indicated that the charging of monopoly prices is not per se unlawful, seemingly undermining any basis for a claim that, when a duty to deal
exists, the dealing must be at “reasonable” (that is, competitive) prices.27
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of “sheet” so low and hold the price of ingot so high, seems to us unquestionable, provided, as we have held, that on this record the price of ingot must be regarded as higher
than a “fair price.”30

30
31
32
33

34

Id. at 437-38.
915 F.2d 17, 18 (1st Cir. 1990).
Id.
The argument is based on the view that there is only one monopoly profit to be made in a
chain of production. The firm in a monopoly position cannot increase its profits by
extending or leveraging that monopoly into a vertically adjacent market. See generally BORK,
supra note 20, at 141; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 199-200 (2d ed., Univ. of
Chicago Press 2001); Ward S. Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67
YALE L.J. 19 (1957). More recent literature suggests that the theorem is riddled with
exceptions. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397 (2009).
The exercise of market power downstream can increase the price of the end product beyond
the price that results from just one firm’s extraction of monopoly profit. See Town of Concord,
915 F.2d at 24-25.
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While the Court’s concern was whether Alcoa’s competitors could survive
given that they had to buy from Alcoa in the upstream market and sell
against Alcoa in the downstream market, the actual test suggested by Judge
Learned Hand used Alcoa’s costs as the benchmark, asking, in effect,
whether Alcoa’s downstream fabricating division could make a profit at the
current price if it had to buy ingot at arm’s length—that is, at Alcoa’s upstream price.
Later in Town of Concord, Massachusetts v. Boston Edison Company, Judge
Breyer (as he then was) referred, generally favorably, to Learned Hand’s
conclusion that, at least in an unregulated context, a price squeeze can
violate section 2, and he cited a number of district and appellate court decisions condemning such price squeezes.31 He also essentially adopted the
conceptual test advocated by Learned Hand: whether the integrated firm
could make a profit in the downstream market if it had to buy its input in an
arms’ length transaction at the monopolist’s upstream price and sell at the
prevailing downstream price.32 Judge Breyer went on to raise some questions
about the theory of a price squeeze and in particular why the upstream
monopolist would feel the need to gain a monopoly in the downstream
market as well, given the “single monopoly profit” theorem.33 He suggested
circumstances where the squeeze might actually benefit consumers, for
example, when it eliminates a less efficient competitor in the downstream
market or when it eliminates a separate monopolist in the downstream
market, thereby avoiding “double marginalization.”34
He also raised questions about the ability of a court to determine when
the gap between the upstream price and the downstream price is too narrow
to allow a competitor to survive, although in doing so he moved away from
Learned Hand’s focus on Alcoa’s costs (could Alcoa make a profit in the
downstream market if it had to buy ingot at Alcoa’s upstream price?) to
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focus on whether a competitor could do so, which raises the issue of
whether the doctrine can ever be used to protect a less efficient competitor
in the downstream market. In the end, Judge Breyer regarded all this as
simply an aside, because he then rejected the application of the price
squeeze theory to firms whose upstream and downstream prices are subject
to regulation, on the grounds that regulation significantly reduces the risk of
harm to consumers from a squeeze.

In linkLine,35 it was alleged that AT&T, the vertically integrated owner of
the fixed telecommunications network, set a high price for wholesale local
loop access and a low price for its retail broadband internet services (DSL),
which squeezed the profit margins of the plaintiffs, who were involved in the
provision of retail broadband internet services, and “exclude[d] and unreasonably impede[d] competition,”36 thus allowing AT&T to “preserve and
maintain its monopoly control of DSL access to the Internet.”37 At the time
of the complaint, AT&T was required by regulation to supply the wholesale
service at a reasonable and nondiscriminatory rate. The regulation ceased
when it was deemed that sufficient competition had been introduced
downstream.
The district court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit38 ruled
that the plaintiffs had a potentially valid claim under section 2 of the
Sherman Act. On appeal, the Supreme Court, rather than looking at the
price squeeze as a single concept, broke it into its component parts, finding
that the “[ p]laintiffs’ price-squeeze claim, looking to the relation between
retail and wholesale prices, is thus nothing more than an amalgamation of a
meritless claim at the retail level and a meritless claim at the wholesale
level.”39
The plaintiffs’ claim that the retail price was too low failed because the
plaintiffs’ did not satisfy the Brooke Group 40 requirements for predatory
pricing—that is, that the defendant’s retail prices are below a relevant
measure of costs for the vertically integrated entity and there is a “dangerous
probability” that they will recoup any lost profits from the period of predation.41 The claim that the wholesale prices were too high failed because,
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
Id. at 443– 44.
Id.
linkLine Commc’ns, Inc. v. SBC Cal., Inc., 503 F.3d 876 (2007).
linkLine, 555 U.S. at 452.
Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
linkLine, 555 U.S. at 451.
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B. The Decision in Pacific Bell Telephone v. linkLine
Communications

268
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since the defendant had no duty to deal at all (in accordance with Trinko), it
clearly did not have a duty to sell at reasonable prices.42
Presumably in linkLine, the reason that the defendant (AT&T) did not
have a duty to deal is that, like the defendant in Trinko, it had never voluntarily engaged in selling at the wholesale level. The Supreme Court stated:

The Supreme Court cited the price squeeze discussion in Alcoa, and
did not explicitly reject it, but it surely does so implicitly by holding
that in those cases where the upstream monopolist had not previously
(voluntarily) sold at arm’s length, according to Trinko, no duty to deal
exists. Referring to Alcoa, the Court states: “Given developments in economic theory and antitrust jurisprudence since Alcoa, we find our recent
decisions in Trinko and Brooke Group more pertinent to the question
before us.”44
Therefore, at least in circumstances where there is no duty to deal at the
upstream level, the Court has apparently foreclosed an argument that the
downstream division of the vertically integrated entity is selling at a loss—
that is, the difference between the retail price and the defendant’s upstream
price is not enough to cover the relevant costs of the downstream operation.45 It is difficult therefore to see whether any liability remains for a
price squeeze, since high prices are not considered objectionable because
“[t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices . . . is what attracts ‘business
acumen’ in the first place.”46
On the refusal to deal claim, the Court seemed to go even further than
Trinko in limiting liability. In particular, the Court described its conclusion
in Trinko to be that the defendant had no antitrust duty to deal at all with
the applicant. The Court did not say, however, that “we had found that the
plaintiff (in Trinko) did not meet its burden to show that the refusal to deal
was not based on a legitimate business reason,” which is what the original
decision seemed to be about. The Court continued to refuse to disavow
42
43
44
45

46

Id. at 450– 51.
Id.
Id. at 452 n.3.
Because the defendant has no duty to reduce the price of the upstream product, the logical
remedy (should such an argument be accepted) would be for the defendant to raise the
downstream price to a level that provided an adequate margin for its downstream
competitors—in effect, serving to orchestrate pricing in the downstream market to eliminate
any significant competition. See, e.g., Sidak, supra note 12, at 297.
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).
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The nub of the complaint in both Trinko and this case is identical—the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants (upstream monopolists) abused their power in the wholesale market
to prevent rival firms from competing effectively in the retail market. Trinko holds that
such claims are not cognizable under the Sherman Act in the absence of an antitrust
duty to deal.43
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Aspen: “[t]here are also limited circumstances in which a firm’s unilateral
refusal to deal with its rivals can give rise to antitrust liability,”47 but failed
to make clear how, without disavowing Aspen, it could hold that Verizon had
no duty to deal at all with rivals unless, as suggested above, the Court
intended to create a safe harbor for firms that have never before sold at a
wholesale level or otherwise cooperated with rivals.
III. THE REGULATION OF A MARGIN SQUEEZE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION UNDER ARTICLE 102 OF THE TFEU

47

48

49

50

51
52

linkLine, 555 U.S. at 448 (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 608– 11 (1985)).
See generally Damian Geradin & Robert O’Donoghue, The Concurrent Application of
Competition Law and Regulation: The Case of Margin Squeeze Abuses in the Telecommunications
Sector, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 355 (2005); Robbie Downing & Alison Jones, Margin
Squeezes in Telecommunications Markets, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: NEW FRONTIERS ch. 10
(Steven Anderman & Ariel Ezrachi eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2011); RICHARD WHISH,
COMPETITION LAW 744-48 (6th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2008); ROBERT O’DONOGHUE &
A. JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 82 303-50 (Hart Publ’g 2006).
Commission Decision of 29 October 1975 Adopting Interim Measures Concerning the
National Coal Board, National Smokeless Fuels Limited and the National Carbonising
Company Limited, 1976 O.J. (L 35) 6.
Commission Decision of 18 July 1988 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC
Treaty (Case No IV/30.178 Napier Brown– British Sugar), 1988 O.J. (L 284) 41 [hereinafter
Napier Brown/British Sugar].
Id. } 66.
Case T-5/97, Industrie des Poudres Sphériques SA v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. II-3755.
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There have been a number of European Commission and European Court
decisions on the abuse of a margin squeeze under Article 102 of the
TFEU.48 The earliest decision, in 1975, was the Commission’s adoption of
interim measures in the National Carbonising case.49 In Napier Brown-British
Sugar,50 British Sugar, which was dominant in both the wholesale market
for the supply of raw sugar and the downstream retail sugar product market,
was found by the Commission to have imposed prices for the two products
where the margin was “insufficient to reflect that dominant company’s own
costs of transformation . . . with the result that competition in the derived
product is restricted.”51 In Industrie des Poudres Sphériques,52 the General
Court recognized the concept of a margin squeeze but upheld the
Commission’s rejection of the complaint because it was based on the applicant’s desire to set its retail prices to cover its higher processing costs.
Three important recent margin squeeze decisions concerned the provision of broadband services by former state-owned monopolies in the liberalized European telecommunications market. In Telefónica, the Commission
imposed a fine of almost E152 million on the Spanish telecommunications
operator Telefónica for a margin squeeze in the Spanish broadband market
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A. The Decision in Deutsche Telekom
Deutsche Telekom is the vertically integrated telecommunications operator
in Germany. It owns and operates the fixed telephone network and sells a
range of retail services including analogue and broadband internet access
and telephone call services. It enjoyed a monopoly in the wholesale and
retail provision of fixed-line telecommunications services until the German
telecommunications market was liberalized on August 1, 1996, by force of
the Telekommunikationsgesetz (German Law on Telecommunications, or
“TKG”). Its first competitor entered the retail market in 1998.
Following liberalization, Deutsche Telekom was required to offer entrants
in the German telecommunications market fully unbundled wholesale
access to the local loop. Its wholesale charges and retail rates for analogue
53

54

55

56
57
58

Summary of Commission Decision of 4 July 2007 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 82
of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/38.784 –Wanadoo España v. Telefónica), 2008 O.J. (C 83) 6
[hereinafter Wanadoo España].
Action Brought on 10 September 2007– Telefónica and Telefónica de Espana v. Commission
(Case T-336/07), 2007 O.J. (C 269) 55.
Commission Decisions of 21 May 2003 Relating to a Proceeding under Article 82 of the EC
Treaty (Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579– Deutsche Telekom AG), 2003 O.J. (L 263)
9 [hereinafter Deutsche Telekom 2003].
Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. II-477.
Deutsche Telekom 2010, supra note 4.
Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42
(Feb. 17, 2011).

Downloaded from http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/ at Cornell University Library on February 13, 2013

from 2001 to 2006.53 The case is currently on appeal to the General
Court.54 In Deutsche Telekom, the European Commission fined Deutsche
Telekom AG E12.6 million for a margin squeeze.55 The Commission’s decision was upheld on appeal to the General Court56 and the European Court
of Justice (ECJ).57 In TeliaSonera Sverige AB,58 the ECJ was requested by
the Stockholm District Court to provide a preliminary ruling on the application of Article 102 in a margin squeeze case. The Swedish Competition
Authority (Konkurrensverket) had fined TeliaSonera the equivalent of E15.1
million for a margin squeeze in breach of Article 102 and its national law
equivalent.
These three cases involved industry structures similar to that in Trinko,
with a competition law claim essentially identical to that in linkLine. The
wholesale and retail telecommunications services in Deutsche Telekom and
Telefónica were subject to some form of sector-specific regulation (as in
Trinko), while the provider in TeliaSonera, like the one in linkLine, had previously been subject to regulation.
These cases demonstrate marked differences between the U.S. and EU
treatment of a margin squeeze and its relationship to a refusal to deal and
the role of antitrust in liberalized telecommunications markets.
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and broadband were subject to some form of regulation by the German telecommunications authority (Reg TP). Some competitors, such as Vodafone,
claimed that the wholesale prices charged by Deutsche Telekom constituted
a margin squeeze—that Deutsche Telekom had pitched its wholesale price at
such a level that they were unable to obtain wholesale access and profitably
sell retail access services in competition with Deutsche Telekom’s own retail
access services.59
1. The “As Efficient Competitor” Test

the difference between the retail prices charged by a dominant undertaking and the
wholesale prices it charges its competitors for comparable services is negative, or insufficient to cover the product-specific costs to the dominant operator of providing its own
retail services on the downstream market.60

The Commission applied the “as efficient competitor” test,61 whereby the
difference in prices did not need to be negative but merely “insufficient to
enable an equally efficient operator to cover its product-specific costs of supplying retail access services. A potential competitor which is just as efficient
as the applicant would not be able to enter the retail access services market
without suffering losses.”62
The relevant costs applied by the Commission were Deutsche Telekom’s
own costs and not the costs of the competing undertaking.63 The “as efficient competitor” test therefore seems to reject the broader reading of Alcoa
(though Learned Head actually applied Alcoa’s own costs) that the dominant firm’s pricing must be such as to permit a rival, regardless of its
59

60

61

62

63

Deutsche Telekom did not contest the finding that it had a dominant position in the
wholesale market in local loop access services and in the retail market in end-user access
services.
Deutsche Telekom 2003, supra note 55, } 107; cf. Deutsche Telekom, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, }
166.
The test is also applied by the European Commission in its Guidance on Article 102, supra
note 5, } 80. For an application of the test in a margin squeeze case in the U.K. water
sector, see Albion Water Ltd. v. Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig [Water Services Regulation
Authority], [2008] All E.R. 314, [2008] EWCA Civ. 536 (Court of Appeal); Albion Water
Ltd. v. Water Services Regulation Authority, [2006] CAT 26 (Competition Appeals
Tribunal).
Deutsche Telekom, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 237. The dominant undertaking “would have been
unable to offer its own retail services without incurring a loss if . . . it had had to pay the
wholesale access price as an internal transfer price for its own retail operations.” Deutsche
Telekom 2003, supra note 55, } 140.
Deutsche Telekom, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 192; cf. TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42,
} 41.
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The Commission established (and this was subsequently approved on
appeal by the General Court and ECJ), that an abusive margin squeeze
involves the imposition of “unfair prices,” contrary to Article 102(a) of the
TFEU, when
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2. The Imputation of Costs and Rejection of Predatory Pricing as a Necessary
Component
The “as efficient competitor” test, like the “fair price” for the wholesale
product in Alcoa, however, raises problematic issues concerning what
64
65

66

67

68

69

Cf. Case T-5/97, Industrie des Poudres Sphériques SA v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. II-3755.
The “reasonably efficient competitor” test is presented as an alternative test to the “as
efficient competitor” test in the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications.
Eur. Comm’n, Notice on the Application of the Competition Rules to Access Agreements in
the Telecommunications Sector– Framework, Relevant Markets and Principles, 1998 O.J. (C
265) 2, } 118, cf. } 117. In National Carbonising, the Commission stated that the dominant
firm’s pricing must “allow a reasonably efficient manufacturer of the derivative a margin
sufficient to enable it to survive in the long-term,” but ultimately applied the dominant
firm’s own costs. Commission Decision of 29 October 1975 Adopting Interim Measures
Concerning the National Coal Board, National Smokeless Fuels Limited and the National
Carbonizing Company Limited, 1976 O.J. (L 35) 6, 7. In rejecting the complaint, the
General Court in British Sugar stated that the test was that of an “equally efficient
competitor.” Napier Brown/British Sugar, supra note 50, }} 66, 180-82. In Telefónica, the
Commission stated that both the “equally efficient competitor” test and the “reasonably
efficient competitor” test applied but ultimately applied the “equally efficient competitor”
test. Eur. Comm’n, Commission Decision of 4 July 2007 Relating to a Proceeding under
Article 82 of the EC Treaty (Case COMP/38.784 –Wanadoo España vs. Telefónica) }}
311-12,
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/38784/
38784_311_10.pdf [hereinafter Telefónica]. In its Guidance on Article 102, the Commission
states that it will generally use the benchmark of the LRAIC of the downstream division of
the integrated dominant undertaking in margin squeeze cases but may rely on the LRAIC of
a nonintegrated downstream competitor when it is not possible to clearly allocate the
dominant undertaking’s cost to downstream and upstream operations. Guidance on Article
102, supra note 5, } 79 n.55.
Deutsche Telekom, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 192; cf. TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42,
} 41.
Gianluca Faella & Roberto Pardolesi, Squeezing Price Squeeze under EC Antitrust Law, 6 EUR.
COMPETITION J. 255, 277 (2010); Sidak, supra note 12, at 297.
Bernard Amory & Alexandre Verheyden, Comments on the CFI’s Ruling in Deutsche Telekom
v. European Commission, GCP MAGAZINE at 9, 11, 2008. For criticism of this as the sole
test, see Geradin & O’Donoghue, supra note 48, at 392– 93.
Faella & Pardolesi, supra note 67, at 276.

Downloaded from http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/ at Cornell University Library on February 13, 2013

efficiency, to earn a normal or “living” profit.64 The test in Deutsche Telekom
also rejects the “reasonably efficient competitor test,” which examines the
costs of a hypothetical reasonably efficient rival.65 As the General Court
pointed out, a focus on the rival’s costs (whether actual or hypothetical) can
be contrary to legal certainty.66 It also raises potential collusion and pricefixing problems, as it can promote discussions between rivals concerning
costs and prices.67 The test can also lead to the protection of less efficient
rivals. While some may view this as appropriate to promote competition in
newly liberalized markets where entrants with a higher cost structure may not
be able to achieve the economies of scale and efficiencies of the dominant
firm,68 this would seem to be a regulatory rather than an antitrust issue.69
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70

71

72

73

74

75

One method that is used by regulators to determine a “fair price” at the wholesale level is
the efficient component pricing rule (ECPR). This method generally allows the incumbent
to maintain all or a substantial part of the downstream profits it would have earned in the
absence of supply (the opportunity cost), thereby reducing the incentives for exclusion. See
generally Geradin & O’Donoghue, supra note 48, at 374– 75; Cf. Telecom Corp. of New
Zealand Ltd. v. Clear Commc’ns Ltd., [1995] 1 NZLR 385. The incumbent may also elect
to incur rather than avoid costs by selling to the downstream competitor. Sidak, supra note
12, at 302.
It is important that mere profit-sacrifice, for example, is not confused with a claim that
pricing does not cover imputed costs. In regulated industries, this may be a consequence of
the regulator setting a wholesale price too high. Sidak, supra note 12, at 287. Deutsche
Telekom had, in fact, argued that its retail price did cover its product-specific costs.
The higher wholesale price may also reflect higher transaction costs in supplying the input to
rivals as opposed to the cost savings brought about by vertically integrated provider. Faella &
Pardolesi, supra note 67, at 279-80.
Deutsche Telekom 2003, supra note 55, } 107; Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n,
2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 167; Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n, 2010 ECJ
EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 159 (Oct. 14, 2010).
Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ Eur-Lex LEXIS 882, } 183; cf. Eur. Comm’n, Margin Squeeze:
Working Paper No. 2 on Competition and Regulation 32 } 4 (DAF/COMP/WP2/WD, 2009).
Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, }} 179-181.
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constitutes an “insufficient price” to enable an equally efficient operator to
cover its product-specific costs of supplying retail access.70 The positive
element, where the price is merely “insufficient to cover the vertically integrated firm’s cost of providing its own services,” is particularly problematic,
and the Commission gave no real indication of how this would be determined in practice.71
It is difficult to impute costs in vertically integrated telecommunications
firms where markets are subject to network effects and where end-user
access services, call services, and other telecommunications services are
mostly offered in a bundle. Requiring the dominant firm to be mindful of
such specificity in pricing decisions, in order to avoid liability, imposes potentially unreasonable transaction costs, which can result in higher prices,
the protection of inefficient competitors, and obstacles to growth and innovation.72 This was especially the case when the Commission, the General
Court, and ECJ in Deutsche Telekom rejected a safe harbor for non-predatory
retail prices. Because the abusive nature of the conduct was connected not
with the level of the wholesale or retail price but with the “unfairness of the
spread,”73 there was no need to demonstrate that the wholesale and retail
prices in themselves were abusive “on account of their excessive or predatory
nature.”74 This is so, notwithstanding the apparent inconsistency that, in
order to avoid the margin squeeze, Deutsche Telekom would have to increase
its retail prices, inviting a possible abuse claim for excessive pricing.75 It also
poses the same possible risk of collusion between rivals that arises from the application of the “reasonably efficient competitor” test, as it invites the dominant firm to hypothesize about its rivals’ costs in order to ensure they have a
sufficient margin to avoid liability. As Robert Bork and other antitrust scholars
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76

77

78
79
80
81

82

83

Telcel Declaration of Economists, supra note 12, at 3-4; Sidak, supra note 12, at 297.
Carlton points out that these higher retail prices “would in essence impose a tax on
consumers of [the downstream product].” Carlton, supra note 13, at 275.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 453 (2009). Sidak, supra note
12, at 296.
Telcel Declaration of Economists, supra note 12, at 9.
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 14; Sidak, supra note 12, at 296.
Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 6; Sidak, supra note 12, at 282, 296; William J. Baumol &
J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1994).
Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42,
2003, supra note 58, } 120; Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R.
II-477, }} 196-97. Tariff rebalancing seeks to increase access prices and reduce prices for
services to ensure that the underlying cost of providing that service is reflected. As Deutsche
Telekom argued, tariff rebalancing is primarily used by regulators to avoid
cross-subsidizations as a result of universal service provision and not for determining liability
for abuse of dominance in an antitrust case. Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG
v. Comm’n, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 211 (Oct. 14, 2010).
See Deutsche Telekom, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 199.
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have pointed out, faced with this uncertainty, the dominant firm will likely
“default to a strategy of refraining from pricing ‘competitively’. . . a dominant
firm’s safe strategy is to raise its retail price to the level at which the leastefficient retailer does not complain . . . [and] act as the price leader and intentionally cede market share to the benefit of its rivals.”76
The determination of a “fair” or “adequate” margin between the wholesale and retail price lacks clarity as a standard of abuse. As the U.S.
Supreme Court stated in linkLine, the finding of a margin squeeze requires
the courts to regulate wholesale and retail prices, and “courts would be
aiming at a moving target, since it is the interaction between these two prices
that may result in a squeeze.”77 This supervisory function would also expect
to continue as costs change over time.78
Such a test leads to the very criticism that the U.S. courts in Trinko and
linkLine ascribed to the determination of a duty to supply, which requires
“antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the proper price,
quantity, and other terms of dealing—a role for which they are ill suited.”79
The Amicus Brief in linkLine noted, “price-squeeze theory is a regulatory
undertaking, not an antitrust cause of action.”80 The pricing of bottleneck
inputs for vertically integrated monopolists is a common regulatory task,81
and such complicated specialist determinations may be best left to a sectorspecific regulator such as the German regulator in Deutsche Telekom.
In determining liability, the Commission applied the regulatory principle
of tariff rebalancing, separating the costs for the provision of retail access
services from call charges.82 It was assumed that “as efficient competitors”
were obliged to offset losses incurred in relation to local network access by
higher call charges and that this would distort competition not only in the
(end-user) access market but also in the telephone calls market.83
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3. The Distortion of Competition as an Absence of “Equality of Opportunity”
The ECJ stated that it was not necessary to demonstrate that the pricing
had a concrete effect on the markets concerned but it was enough for
the Commission to demonstrate that the conduct was capable of an exclusionary effect, even if the result hoped for may not be achieved.89 It
84

85
86

87
88
89

The ECJ found that the retail market for end-user access services constitutes a separate
market and “those other telecommunications services fall within markets that are distinct
from the latter market.” Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 236.
Deutsche Telekom, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 194.
Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 199 (citing Case C-62/86, AKZO
v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. I-3359, } 72); cf. Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera
Sverige AB, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, } 40 (Feb. 17, 2011). See generally Frank
H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1981).
Geradin & O’Donoghue, supra note 48, at 394.
Deutsche Telekom, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 116; see infra below.
Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, }} 183, 253-54 (“However, in the
absence of any effect on the competitive situation of competitors, a pricing practice such as
that at issue cannot be classified as exclusionary if it does not make their market penetration
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Is it appropriate, however, to separate access services from telephone calls
for the purposes of this analysis?84 It might be more in keeping with commercial practice and economic efficiency in these markets if the court considered the profitability of a cluster of services offered by the competitors,
including telephony services, where they could acquire additional revenue
and efficiency savings rather than access services alone.85 If services are
usually bundled, cross-subsidies and price discrimination may not always be
detrimental. Clearly, the ECJ was also of the view that counter-strategies
were unavailable to rival firms, stating that a “dominant undertaking cannot
drive from the market undertakings which are perhaps as efficient as the
dominant undertaking but which, because of their smaller financial
resources, are incapable of withstanding the competition waged against
them.”86
Damian Geradin and Robert O’Donoghue have argued that, where products are bundled in telecommunications markets, the cost structures of
rivals should be considered, because they can make cost savings: “In
markets where there is no simple, linear chain of production a margin
squeeze test based only on the cost structure of the dominant firm may
therefore give a misleading picture of rivals’ costs and competitive constraints.”87 Because ascertaining a rival’s costs introduces uncertainties, it
may therefore serve competition and avoid false positives in these particular
markets to defer to the reasonable pricing decisions of the dominant firm.
This was largely the response of the German regulator in Deutsche Telekom,
which rejected a margin squeeze claim because rival operators could offer
their end users competitive prices by resorting to cross-subsidized charges
for access services and call charges.88
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90

91

92

93

any more difficult.”); cf. TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, }} 61-64; cf. Case
T-219/99, British Airways v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-5917, } 293. In Deutsche Telekom, the
Commission stated that once a margin squeeze was established, it was not necessary to
examine any effects on competition, but it went on to examine those effects. Deutsche Telekom
2003, supra note 55, }} 179-83.
Deutsche Telekom 2003, supra note 55, } 198; Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS
882, }} 230, 233.
Inequality as the General Court defines it is inevitable because the owner of the vertically
integrated network does not need to rely on wholesale (local loop access) services in order to
be able to offer (end-user) access services. Deutsche Telekom 2003, supra note 55, } 238.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 455 (2009) (citing PHILIP
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 126 (2nd ed., Aspen Publishers
2002)).
Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, }} 190, 203. The concept has been
applied in this manner by the ECJ to entrants in telecommunications markets in the context
of freedom to provide services:
It may become apparent that operators which have or have had exclusive or special
rights were able to enjoy, before other operators, a position allowing them to redeem
their costs of establishing networks. The fact that operators entering the market are
subject to public service obligations, including those concerning territorial cover, is
likely to put them, in terms of controlling their costs, in an unfavourable position by
comparison with traditional operators.
Joined Cases C-544/03 & C-545/03, Mobistar SA v. Commune de Fléron & Belgacom
Mobile SA v. Commune de Schaerbeek, 2005 E.C.R. I-7723, } 49.

Downloaded from http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/ at Cornell University Library on February 13, 2013

was claimed that undistorted competition between Deutsche Telekom
and its competitors could only be guaranteed if “equality of opportunity” was secured between the various economic operators.90 However, is
the concept of “equality of opportunity” a useful antitrust standard? Its
application, particularly in circumstances where markets are highly regulated and costs are not easily isolated, may have the propensity to create
false positives and further distort competition. Equality of opportunity
also lacks meaning when one firm is a vertically integrated owner of the
fixed network and the other an entrant in the downstream market.91 As
the Supreme Court noted in linkLine, citing Philip Areeda and Herbert
Hovenkamp, “it is difficult to see any competitive significance [of a
price squeeze] apart from the consequences of vertical integration
itself.”92
The concept of “equality of opportunity” is also difficult to apply in circumstances where the dominant firm, unlike its competitors, is subject to
obligations derived from sector-specific regulation regarding unbundling,
nondiscriminatory access, universal services, and tariff rebalancing and the
requirement to offer its customers operator ( pre)selection, or “call-by-call,”
selection.93 Any attempt to incorporate these differences within a calculus to
determine “equality of opportunity” is ultimately ineffectual and raises
similar analytical difficulties as the “reasonably efficient competitor” test and
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Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 7.
Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 176 (citing Case C-202/07 P, France
Télécom SA v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. I-2369, } 105 and the case-law cited therein).
96
Id. } 180 (citing Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia and Others, 2008
E.C.R. I-7139, } 68); cf. Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011
ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, } 24 (Feb. 17, 2011).
97 .
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004). The
Court also states: “Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some
tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the
monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.” Id. at
407-08.
98
Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 176.
99
Id. } 174 (citing Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche v. Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461, } 91; Case
322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, } 70;
AKZO, 1991 E.C.R. I-3359, } 69; Case C-95/04 P, British Airways v. Comm’n, 2007
E.C.R. I-2331, } 66; Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom SA v. Comm’n, 2009
E.C.R. I-2369, } 104).
100
Formally found in Article 3(1)(g) of the EC Treaty. Article 3(3) of the Treaty on the EU
(TEU) states that the European Union is to establish an internal market, which, in
accordance with Protocol (No 27) on the Internal Market and Competition, annexed to the
Treaty of Lisbon, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 309, 309, is to include a system ensuring that
95
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the “living profit” requirement in Alcoa, which, as we have seen, have largely
been rejected by the EU courts.
These concepts demonstrate the vast distinction between the EU and
U.S. approaches to abuse of monopoly and provide the basis for the claim
made in the Amicus Brief that EU law protects competitors, while U.S. law
protects consumer welfare: “It becomes necessary to hypothesize what an efficient competitor would be and then determine whether the defendant’s
wholesale and retail prices permit the efficient competitor to earn some level
of profit deemed to be sufficient.”94
The EU model of competition law, as embedded in Articles 101 and 102
of the TFEU, has been traditionally associated with rules to safeguard the
totality of the competitive process rather than the U.S. embrace of efficient
outcomes and “total welfare.” As the ECJ in Deutsche Telekom points out,
Article 102 “refers not only to practices which may cause damage to consumers directly, but also to those which are detrimental to them through their
impact on competition[,]”95 and it aims “to protect consumers by means of
undistorted competition.”96 Unlike in the United States, where, under
section 2 of the Sherman Act, “there is no duty to aid competitors,”97 a
dominant undertaking under Article 102 has a special responsibility “not to
allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the
common market”98 through recourse to methods different from those governing normal competition in products or services.99
The EU focus on preserving rivalry, preventing foreclosure, and ensuring
“competition on the merits” is derived from an institutional and political
history that prioritizes market integration and sets out a system ensuring
that competition in the internal market is not distorted.100 It favors the
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the small market shares acquired by the applicant’s competitors in the retail access
market since the market was liberalized . . . are evidence of the restrictions which the
applicant’s pricing practices have imposed on the growth of competition in those
markets.106

101

102
103
104
105

106

competition is not distorted. Articles 101 and 102 form part of the competition rules
referred to in Article 3(1)(b) TFEU. See TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, }}
20-22. EU competition law has its theoretical foundations in the political and economic
ideas of “ordoliberalism,” which originated in the 1930s in Germany, particularly in the
University of Freiburg. See DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH
CENTURY EUROPE, PROTECTING PROMETHEUS ch. 7 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998). Under
this view, “there is neither unconstrained private power nor discretionary governmental
intervention in the economy . . . competition is a value in itself and not just a means by
which purely economic objectives—such as efficiency—are to be achieved.” ALISON JONES
& BRENDA SUFRIN, EU COMPETITION LAW 35 (4th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
See, e.g., Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601, } 783; David
Howarth & Kathryn McMahon, “Windows Has Performed an Illegal Operation”: The Court of
First Instance’s Judgment in Microsoft v. Commission, 29 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 117
(2008).
Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 182.
Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 235.
Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 178.
Id. } 175 (citing Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983
E.C.R. 3461, } 73; Case C-95/04 P, British Airways plc v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-2331, }
67).
Deutsche Telekom, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 239 (cited by Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ
EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 257).
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fostering of short-term competitive rivalry as the best way to ensure longterm investment incentives,101 rather than the U.S. goal of encouraging outcomes that are economically efficient as a way of promoting consumer
welfare.
The question must be asked, however, whether consumer detriment
always flows from distortion of competition and a reduction in equality of
opportunity. In Deutsche Telekom, the distortion brought about by the margin
squeeze resulted in “limitation of the choices available to them [consumers]
and, therefore, of the prospect of a longer-term reduction of retail prices as
a result of competition.”102 The General Court stated that this anticompetitive effect related to the “possible barriers to entry which the applicant’s
pricing practices could have created for the growth of competition in that
market.”103 The ECJ considered that pricing practices can be abusive when
access for competitors is “made more difficult”104 and “the practice tends to
remove or restrict the buyer’s freedom to choose his sources of supply,
to bar competitors from access to the market, to apply dissimilar conditions
to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at
a competitive disadvantage.”105
It is difficult to see how non-predatory pricing practices can create barriers to entry in these circumstances. The General Court found that
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These small market shares could be explained by other factors, however, especially when new entrants in other liberalized markets within the EU
member states also experienced limited growth. In Town of Concord, Justice
Breyer acknowledged that a margin squeeze can harm the competitive
process by obstructing “the achievement of competition’s basic goals—lower
prices, better products, and more efficient production methods[,]”107 but
this cannot be equated with a finding derived from mere “equality of
opportunity.”
4. The Establishment of an “Exclusionary Purpose”

As a matter of logic, it may be that a particular price squeeze can only be exclusionary if
the refusal by the monopolists to sell to the “squeezed customer” would also be exclusionary. But a court, faced with a price squeeze rather than a refusal to deal, is unlikely
to find the latter (hypothetical) question any easier to answer than the former.110

Justice Breyer seems to suggest that the retail price need not amount to
predatory pricing, but whether it is exclusionary for antitrust purposes
“depends upon a host of factors, including, for example, the market position
of the defendant, the nature of the market, and the nature of the defendant’s
conduct.”111
The European Commission, in its Guidance on the Commission’s
Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article [102] (Guidance on Article 102),
states that it regards a margin squeeze as a form of “constructive refusal to
supply” and requires the establishment of the elements of a duty to deal
under Article 102.112 The EU courts, unlike those in the United States,
which, as we have seen, have considerably diminished the circumstances
when a duty to deal will be found, have imposed such a duty under Article
107
108
109

110
111
112

Town of Concord, Mass. v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990).
Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg joined with Justice Breyer’s opinion.
Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 458 (2009) (Breyer, J.) (citing
Verizon Commc’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004); Aspen
Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985)).
Id.
Id.
Guidance on Article 102, supra note 5, } 79. These elements are: the refusal relates to a
product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively in a
downstream market; the refusal is likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition
on the downstream market; and the refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm. Id. } 81.

Downloaded from http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/ at Cornell University Library on February 13, 2013

The key difficulty with the concept of “equality of opportunity” is that it
does not correspond either to an exclusionary purpose or to a finding of
consumer detriment. As Justice Breyer points out in his separate concurring
judgment in linkLine,108 a price squeeze can be exclusionary conduct, in the
sense recognized by Trinko and Aspen, where conduct, even if profitable,
indicates a “willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end.”109 As Justice Breyer notes:
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Moreover, it does not appear that there are any technical, legal or even economic obstacles capable of making it impossible, or even unreasonably difficult, for any other publisher of daily newspapers to establish, alone or in cooperation with other publishers, its
own nationwide home-delivery scheme and use it to distribute its own daily
newspapers.117

The ECJ declared that it was “not enough to argue that it is not economically viable by reason of the small circulation.”118 It inquired instead whether it
was economically viable to create a second nation-wide home-delivery
network for a newspaper with a comparable circulation to allow it to
compete on equal terms with the incumbent.119
5. “Indispensability” in a Regulated Context
The question then arises, in cases such as those under consideration here,
whether the Bronner principles must be established, or does a regulated duty
to supply equate with the determination of “indispensability” of the input,
meaning that there “is no actual or potential substitute”?120 This issue was
113

114
115
116
117
118
119
120

Cases 6 & 7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano Spa & Commercial Solvents
Corp. v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 223, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309; Cases C-241-242/91 P,
Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) & Independent Television Publ’ns Ltd (ITP) v. Comm’n,
1995 E.C.R. I-743, [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 718; Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co.
KG v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, [1999] 4 C.M.L.R. 112; Case C-418/01, IMS
Health v. NDC Health, 2004 E.C.R. I-5039, [2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 28; Case T-201/04,
Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601.
As it has been subsequently defined.
Oscar Bronner, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, } 41.
Id. } 43.
Id. } 44.
Id. } 45.
Id. } 68. The ECJ referred to the opinion of the Advocate General. Id. } 46.
The EU regulatory framework provides that ex ante regulation is generally required in
circumstances of market failure where there is insufficient competition in alternative inputs
such as satellite, wireless, and cable, and where national and Community competition law
remedies are not sufficient to address the problem. Cf. Directive 2002/21/EC (Framework
Directive), 2002 O.J. (L 180) 33, } 27.
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102 in a number of decisions.113 In Oscar Bronner, the applicant newspaper
publisher sought access to the existing newspaper distribution network of
the dominant publisher (Mediaprint) rather than develop its own distribution scheme. For a refusal to supply under Article 102, the ECJ required
that the refusal must be likely to eliminate all competition (or effective competition)114 in the relevant market, the service in itself must be indispensable
to carrying on that person’s business (inasmuch as there is no actual or potential substitute), and the refusal must be incapable of being objectively justified.115 In determining the issue of “indispensability,” the ECJ stated that
other methods of distributing daily newspapers existed, even though they
may be less advantageous:116
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It is clear from the considerations underlying both the EC and Spanish law and regulation that Telefónica’s duty to supply the relevant upstream products results from a balancing by the public authorities of the incentives of Telefónica and its competitors to invest
and innovate. This is because the need to promote downstream competition in the long
term by imposing access to Telefónica’s upstream inputs exceeds the need to preserve
Telefónica’s ex ante incentives to invest in and exploit the upstream infrastructure in question for its own benefit.123

But the question of indispensability of the input under Bronner is a broader
investigation than the question of whether imposing a duty to supply will be
detrimental to the incumbent’s ex ante investment incentives.124 Bronner
examines the ex post investment incentives in the market. A duty to deal will
not be imposed in circumstances where investment is economically viable,
121

122

123

124

Telefónica, supra note 65, }} 271-72, 300-01. The Commission in Telefónica interprets
Bronner as requiring an assessment of whether an undertaking with an efficiency level
comparable to that of the infrastructure owner is able to replicate the input. Id. } 300.
Applying the requirements in Bronner, Telefónica argued that (1) there were real and/or
potential alternatives to its wholesale access services (ULL and wholesale access to cable
networks), (2) the regional and national wholesale access services of Telefónica could be
replicated, and (3) the alleged conduct is not likely to eliminate all competition in the
downstream market. Id. } 301.
Id. } 303. The Commission sets out this approach in its Guidance on Article 102, supra
note 5, } 82. The Commission found in any event that Telefónica was dominant in both the
upstream market (for wholesale broadband at regional and national levels) and the
downstream retail market (for all standard broadband products through ADSL or any other
technology). It also found that it was uneconomic to duplicate the local access network.
These factors, as Geradin argues, would most probably result in a finding of
indispensability in any event, “as there did not seem to be a serious alternative to
Telefónica’s DSL network.” Damian Geradin, Refusal to Supply and Margin Squeeze: A
Discussion of Why the ‘Telefónica Exceptions’ Are Wrong 4 (Tilburg Law & Econ. Center,
Discussion Paper No. 2011-009, 2011), available at http://SSRN.com/abstract=1750226.
Similarly, the Commission in Deutsche Telekom found that there were insufficient alternatives
to the wholesale local loop access services: Deutsche Telekom, 2003 O.J. (L 263) 9, } 83;
Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 236-37.
Geradin expresses a similar view. Geradin, supra note 123, at 8. See also Faella & Pardolesi,
supra note 67, at 271.
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considered by the Commission in Telefónica and by the ECJ in TeliaSonera.
Telefónica argued that the appropriate test for a margin squeeze was that of
Bronner and a “constructive refusal to supply.”121 It argued further that (as
in Trinko) it did not have a duty to supply its wholesale products absent the
requirement under Spanish Telecommunications law.122
The Commission, in its Guidance on Article 102 and in Telefónica, and the
ECJ, in TeliaSonera, have stated that if there is a regulated duty to supply,
there is no need to consider a margin squeeze within the elements of a
refusal to supply as determined by Bronner, because the relevant questions
about balancing of the ex ante investment decisions and the promotion of
competition in the downstream market have already been undertaken by the
regulatory authority. The Commission in Telefónica stated:
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B. The Decision of the ECJ in TeliaSonera
The question remains, in the absence of a regulated duty to supply, is it a requirement for a margin squeeze in the European Union to establish the elements of a refusal to supply, or is a finding of “insufficient spread”
enough?128 This issue was considered by the ECJ in a preliminary ruling on
125

126

127

Geradin argues that the Commission’s approach is fundamentally flawed, as the decision by
the regulator under the liberalization framework centers on a more narrow determination of
“substantial market power” that brings into place automatic access obligations that are
made at a different time and in different market conditions to the issue that arises under
Article 102. Geradin, supra note 123, at 9.
See Faella & Pardolesi, supra note 67, 272; Giorgio Monti, Managing the Intersection of
Utilities Regulation and EC Competition Law, 4 COMPETITION L. REV. 123 (2008).
The Commission in Telefónica, supra note 65, }} 543-44, did examine the effect on
competition, finding that the margin squeeze was a profitable rational strategy for Telefónica
and that Spanish retail prices were excessive and well above the EU average. It found that
“by reducing the competitive constraints at the retail level, Telefónica is able to sustain a
high level of retail prices. . . . The profits extracted from a high level of retail prices surpass
by far the forsaken profits related to the forsaken wholesale sales as a result of high
wholesale prices (relative to the retail prices).” Id. } 611. In the context of linkLine, Sidak
questions the probability of recovering lost profits from mass market sales to large numbers
of customers when wholesale prices are raised to niche market ISP players: Sidak, supra
note 12, at 288. This finding would require a complex factual analysis in any event, which
was not undertaken here. The Commission’s assessment also ignores that in order to avoid
price squeeze liability, Telefónica would need to raise retail prices in any event to the
detriment of consumers.
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by the applicant alone or with others, in infrastructure of the size or scope
of the incumbents. This is a broader inquiry than a purely regulatory one
that aims to foster new entry or greater competition in a newly liberalized
market. Regulators must also take into account objectives that differ from
those applicable under competition law.125 Applying competition law in
these circumstances does not merely supplement regulation ex post to
prevent abuses of market power but reconstitutes competition law as a form
of de facto regulation in liberalized markets.126
Even if a regulated duty to supply is deemed sufficient for indispensability, the remaining elements of the Bronner test, such as the requirements of
the likelihood of the elimination of effective competition and objective justification, should still be considered. As we have pointed out, the assessment
of the likelihood of anticompetitive effect was equated to mere “equality of
opportunity” in Deutsche Telekom.127 An examination under Bronner would
move the focus from the access service market to the cluster of retail services
and require the consideration of other potential sources of competition in
the downstream market (including cable, mobile, wireless, and satellite services). If a rival firm is found to have market power in this market, a margin
squeeze could be procompetitive because it may prevent the possibility of
“double marginalization.”
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charging a price (margin squeeze) which prevents an as-efficient competitor from competing downstream operates in effect as a refusal to deal and implies that the same framework of analysis and the general concerns about the incentives of dominant undertakings
to invest should apply . . . the NCA claims that there is an abusive margin squeeze merely
on the basis of the insufficient spread between wholesale and retail prices, irrespective of
the indispensability of the input. I consider that this approach is incorrect and
insufficient.135
128

129

130
131
132

133
134
135

In margin squeeze cases in non-regulated markets, such as Napier Brown, this question did
not necessarily arise because the input was arguably indispensable. Napier Brown/British
Sugar, supra note 50, } 66. In Telefónica, however, the Commission disputes this
interpretation, stating that a finding of indispensability of the input has not been a
requirement for a finding of a margin squeeze abuse in previous decisions, even in
non-regulated markets. It explains the Napier Brown finding as related to the question of
dominance not indispensability. Telefónica, supra note 65, } 734.
Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42
(Feb. 17, 2011).
Id. }} 32, 42.
Id. } 34.
Id. } 99. On recoupment in predatory pricing in the EU, see Case C-202/07 P, France
Télécom SA v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. I-2369.
TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, } 54.
Id. } 56.
Opinion of Advocate General Mazák in TeliaSonera (E.C.J), } 16 (citing Case C-7/97,
Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791) [hereinafter
Comments of Mazák].
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the application of Article 102 in Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige
AB.129 TeliaSonera was charged with pricing its wholesale access services to
competitors and its broadband ADSL internet services to end users at
prices that were insufficient to cover the incremental cost that it had to incur
in providing end user services. The wholesale and retail services, unlike
those in Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica, were not subject to sector-specific
regulation.
The ECJ confirmed that the test for a margin squeeze was that of the “as efficient competitor”130 and that there was no need for the wholesale or retail
prices to be abusive in themselves131 or that any losses be capable of recoupment.132 TeliaSonera argued that, in the absence of a regulated duty to supply,
the test for a margin squeeze had to go beyond the mere finding of an insufficient price spread and be considered under the general principles of a refusal
to supply as set out in Bronner.133 In reply, the ECJ stated that a margin
squeeze can “constitute an independent form of abuse distinct from that of
refusal to supply”134 and that there was no need to apply the elements as set
out in Bronner in the absence of a regulated duty to supply. The test for a
margin squeeze in the European Union is therefore one solely focused on the
spread (whether positive or negative) between the wholesale and retail prices.
This approach is, as we have seen, contrary to that proposed by the
Commission in its Guidance on Article 102 and to the Opinion of Advocate
General Mazák in TeliaSonera, where he stated:
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the possibility cannot be ruled out that, by reason simply of the fact that the wholesale
product is not indispensable for the supply of the retail product, a pricing practice which
136
137
138
139
140

141

142
143

Id. } 21.
TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, } 55.
Id. } 56.
Id. } 58.
Oscar Bronner had argued that Mediaprint had discriminated against it, contrary to Article
102, in making their delivery service available to another rival newspaper, Wirtschaftsblatt,
which had purchased these services as part of a package. Oscar Bronner, 1998 E.C.R.
I-7791, } 8. Given the Court’s ruling on the refusal to supply issue, it was not necessary to
answer this question. Id. }} 48, 49.
See, e.g., the decisions on tying or exclusive purchasing: Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh
Foods Ltd. v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-4653; Case C-552/03 P, Unilever Bestfoods
v. Comm’n, 2006 E.C.R. I-9091; Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007
E.C.R. II-3601; cf. Comments of Mazák, supra note 135, } 22-23.
See, e.g., Microsoft, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601.
TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, }} 64-69.
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While not going as far as the U.S. courts in providing a safe harbor if there has
been no previous course of dealing, Mazák argued that if a dominant undertaking could lawfully have refused to provide the products, then it “should not
be reproached for providing those products at conditions which its competitors may consider not advantageous. Indeed, it is difficult to see how in such a
case the alleged insufficient margin could be anti-competitive.”136
The ECJ likened a margin squeeze where access had been given voluntarily to a situation of the law regulating terms of a contract, similar to the
abuse of tying under Article 102. The ECJ stated that the Bronner elements
were inapplicable when the facts involve “supplying services or selling goods
on conditions which are disadvantageous or on which there might be no
purchaser”137 and that these “constitute an independent form of abuse distinct from that of a refusal to supply”138 because not all aspects of the terms
of trade by a dominant undertaking need to be considered under a refusal to
supply.139 The ECJ noted that in Bronner, Mediaprint was also alleged to
have abused its position by refusing Oscar Bronner access to its home delivery service unless it was also willing to purchase a package of services including printing and marketing through other sales points such as kiosks.140
But a margin squeeze differs in a fundamental way from a “conditional
sale” contract, which is characteristic of tying and exclusive dealing.141 The
EU case law in these areas can also be criticized as being excessively formulaic and not always mindful of the economic consequences of these agreements.142 In fact, these cases, in as far as they deal with the issues of
leverage and raising rivals’ costs, would also be better dealt with under the
Bronner principles.
The ECJ did add, however, that in the assessment of whether the
conduct was capable of an exclusionary effect, a finding of indispensability
was a relevant, though not a necessary, element:143
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causes margin squeeze may not be able to produce any anti-competitive effect, even
potentially.144

144
145
146
147

148
149
150

151
152

Id. } 72.
Id. } 69.
Id. } 70.
Cf. Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v. NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG,
2004 E.C.R. I-5039.
Comments of Mazák, supra note 135, } 20.
TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, } 72.
Id. }} 66-67 (citing Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n, 2010 ECJ
EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 254 (Oct. 14, 2010)).
Id. } 74.
The ECJ goes on to state that an exclusionary effect can be outweighed by proof of
efficiencies as an objective justification. Id. } 76. A successful efficiency argument, however,
should lead to an initial finding that the vertically integrated dominant supplier’s prices do
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Even so, the notion of indispensability here is more narrowly construed than
in Bronner. It is defined as the “functional relationship of the wholesale products to the retail products[,]”145 where the “supply of the wholesale
product is indispensable for the sale of the retail product.”146 It is dependent
on how the retail market is defined. For example, if the retail product
market is narrowly defined as the ADSL broadband market, then
TeliaSonera’s wholesale product would be an indispensable input to this
downstream “secondary” market. Indispensability of the input under
Bronner is a broader question than merely being requested or required by a
downstream retail competitor to supply.147 As noted in the Opinion by
Advocate General Mazák, a number of alternative technologies were apparently available to provide end users with broadband services, and
TeliaSonera’s network could have been replicated by its competitors ( jointly
or severally) or third parties.148
In assessing whether the margin squeeze was capable of having an anticompetitive effect on the market,149 the ECJ in TeliaSonera did not apply the
Bronner requirement of the likelihood of the elimination of all competition
on the downstream market but rather found it sufficient if the conduct
creates barriers or hinders growth, “making it more difficult” to penetrate
the market.150 Even in the more problematic circumstances where the
pricing margin is positive, the ECJ considered that it is enough if there is
“reduced profitability” or it is made “at least more difficult for the operators
concerned to trade on the market concerned.”151
This assessment is narrowly based on “equality of opportunity,” where
pricing is considered a barrier to entry. This approach, as we have argued, is
problematic and potentially detrimental to consumer welfare. This is true a
fortiori when it is applied in circumstances where there is no regulated duty
to supply and the general elements of the refusal to supply test in Bronner
are not required.152
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153
154

155

not constitute a margin squeeze, as found by the German regulator in Deutsche Telekom. See
infra.
TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, } 95.
Previous EU case law has placed emphasis on the existence of a previous course of dealing,
but for reasons that differ from Aspen and that mainly concern the effect that the refusal will
have on the customer’s relationship-specific investments, made in the expectation of
continuance of the supply agreement. United Brands v. Comm’n, 1978 E.C.R. 207, [1978]
1 C.M.L.R. 429, } 182; cf. Liptons Cash Registers Hugin, 1978 O.J. (L 22) 23, [1978] 1
C.M.L.R. D19.
TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, } 94.
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The ECJ in TeliaSonera also established that liability for a margin squeeze
should not be dependent on whether the wholesale supply concerned a previous course of dealing or supply to a new customer.153 As we have seen in
Trinko and linkLine, the U.S. courts are unlikely to impose a duty to deal
(and therefore liability for a margin squeeze) in circumstances were there
has been no previous voluntary arm’s length dealing. This reasoning is
derived from the finding in Aspen where the termination of a presumably
profitable supply agreement ( joint venture) without legitimate business
reasons suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an
anticompetitive end, giving rise to an inference of an exclusionary purpose.
The same inferences, of a possible anticompetitive motive being drawn from
the defendant’s prior conduct, cannot be drawn, however, either in a situation of a regulated duty to deal or where there has been no previous voluntary course of dealing.
This highlights a crucial difference between the EU and U.S. approaches
to competition law and the regulation of a margin squeeze in particular. In
the United States, an understanding of prior conduct is crucial to the antitrust question of whether an exclusionary purpose exists. In the European
Union, the prior conduct is considered irrelevant154 because it is thought to
have no bearing on the effect of the conduct on an “as efficient competitor”
or the creation of barriers that prevent new entrants.155 The European
Union is less focused on investigating whether the defendant has an exclusionary purpose and more focused on ensuring an “adequate margin”
between the wholesale and retail prices to achieve “equality of opportunity.”
The decision of the ECJ in TeliaSonera significantly broadens liability for
a margin squeeze in non-regulated industries. Liability will be imposed
when a vertically integrated dominant undertaking sets its upstream and
downstream prices negatively or merely insufficiently to cover downstream
incremental costs. Apart from its lack of specificity as an antitrust standard,
the dominant firm has an incentive to avoid liability by increasing downstream prices to the detriment of consumers. Most significantly, in the
absence of a regulated duty to supply, it serves as a disincentive for the dominant undertaking to supply the input in the first place. Alternately, where
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there is a duty to supply the wholesale input under Article 102, the undertaking may decide to withdraw from the downstream retail
market altogether, thereby reducing (or distorting) competition and efficiency in that market.156 It is also in opposition to the general principle
under Article 102 that being in a dominant position per se is not an
abuse,157 as the charging of a monopoly price is generally lawful for a dominant undertaking. While this latter principle is qualified in the European
Union by the abuse of excessive pricing, as we have seen, wholesale or retail
prices do not have to be abusive in themselves for a finding of a margin
squeeze.

The ECJ in TeliaSonera was also asked to decide whether the test for a
margin squeeze should be modified in the case of a rapidly developing technology market.158 Prices for high technology services such as broadband in
innovative and emerging markets, are often priced low initially, achieving
lower levels of profitability or even a loss, in order to take into account likely
future network and learning effects. High start-up costs are seen as an investment in future profits, where costs can be averaged over a larger customer base. In this way, prices, although they do not cover notional
product-specific costs in the short run, may not reflect an exclusionary
purpose, because network effects can have consumer benefits.
The dominant undertaking in Telefónica had argued that it was using
lower prices to stimulate demand and take account of likely future earnings
in a non-mature new technology market.159 The Commission applied the
long-run average incremental cost (LRAIC) benchmark to make allowance
for the higher fixed costs and long-run lower incremental costs in these
network markets.160 Difficulties arise, however, concerning how the
common costs of the downstream asset should be allocated.161 The
Commission applied both the “period by period”162 and the discounted
cash flow (DCF) approaches to examine profitability. The latter approach
allows some idea of the firm’s future growth and profitability to be taken
into account by aggregating the expected future cash flows to result at net
156
157

158
159
160

161
162

Carlton, supra note 13, at 278.
Case 322/81, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, }
57.
TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, } 12.
Id. } 646.
Id. }} 317-18, 323. The Commission indicated in its Guidance on Article 102, supra note
5, } 80, that they will generally use the benchmark of the LRAIC of the downstream
division of the integrated dominant undertaking in margin squeeze cases.
Telefónica, supra note 65, } 431.
As applied in Case C-202/07 P, France Télécom SA v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. I-2369.

Downloaded from http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/ at Cornell University Library on February 13, 2013

C. The Analysis of a Margin Squeeze in Network Markets with
Learning Effects
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Particularly in a rapidly growing market, Article 102 TFEU requires action as quickly as
possible, to prevent the formation and consolidation in that market of a competitive
structure distorted by the abusive strategy of an undertaking . . . before the
anti-competitive effects of that strategy are realised.167
163
164

165

166

167

Telefónica, supra note 65, } 334.
Eur. Comm’n, Margin Squeeze: Working Paper No. 2 on Competition and Regulation 32 } 28
(DAF/COMP/WP2/WD, 2009).
Telefónica, supra note 65, }} 650, 652. Both methods, according to the Commission,
exhibited a margin squeeze. Id. } 541. “Telefónica’s downstream losses cannot be regarded
as temporary or aimed at searching scale economies and learning effects because
Telefónica’s downstream activity still generates losses more than 5 years after its start.” Id. }
650. There were other less restrictive ways of achieving these efficiencies.
See generally George Priest, Flawed Efforts to Apply Modern Antitrust Law to Network
Industries, in HIGH STAKES ANTITRUST (Robert Hahn ed., AEI-Brookings Joint Center for
Regulatory Studies 2003); POSNER, supra note 33, ch. 8.
Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS
42, }} 108, 111 (Feb. 17, 2011). The Commission in Telefónica stated that Article 102 does
not provide for an exception for new technology markets where the market is growing
rapidly and is not fully mature. Telefónica, supra note 65, } 623; cf. Case T-340/03, France
Télécom v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-107 } 107. Similar views were expressed by the
General Court in Microsoft. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R.
II-3601, } 562.
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present value (NPV) over the economic life of the asset, allowing the recovery of initial losses by future profits.
The Commission was wary, however, of a positive NPV under the DCF
approach, as it could equally be interpreted as either the absence of a
margin squeeze or as the outcome of abusive behavior: “That is, short-run
losses might lead to higher long-run profits, not due to any natural development in the market, but due to the strengthening of the dominant undertaking’s market power.”163 The DCF could be biased because it can include
the rewards from anticompetitive behavior.164
While the Commission was ready to acknowledge that significant economies of scale or strong learning effects, in exceptional cases, could justify
temporary prices below LRAIC, these could not serve to legitimize a margin
squeeze that enables the vertically integrated company to impose losses
upon its competitors that it does not incur itself.165
It is unclear, however, when these exceptional circumstances will arise
for the Commission. In dynamic markets, the exclusionary/nonexclusionary basis of these projected earnings will rarely be clear, particularly if they require a profit projection where there are likely network
effects. In the United States, this level of uncertainty in innovation and
network markets will largely caution against antitrust intervention to avoid
the risk of false positives and possible discouragement of significant and
risky investment.166
Instead of acknowledging that intervention in these markets may be problematic, the contrary approach was adopted by the ECJ in TeliaSonera:
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D. The Analysis of a Margin Squeeze in a Regulated Industry
These decisions also highlight major differences in the U.S. and EU treatment of the intersection between antitrust and sector-specific regulation.
Deutsche Telekom, Telefónica, and TeliaSonera all concerned previously
state-owned monopolies in liberalized telecommunications markets. Many of
the access and pricing issues in Deutsche Telekom and Telefónica were also
subject to national regulation.
In the United States, the presence of a federal and state statutory access
regime in the telecommunications market was thought to “significantly diminish the likelihood of major antitrust harm”172 in Trinko, making it unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine of forced access under section 2 of
the Sherman Act.173 The Supreme Court stated that antitrust analysis must
always be attuned to the particular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue, including awareness of the significance of regulation:174 “In
short, the regime was an effective steward of the antitrust function. Against
the slight benefits of antitrust intervention here, we must weigh a realistic assessment of its costs.”175
168
169
170
171
172

173
174
175

TeliaSonera, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, } 109. See infra.
Telefónica, supra note 65, } 304.
Id. } 305.
Id. } 306.
Verizon Commc’ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004); cf. Credit
Suisse Securities LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 284 (2007).
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 411.
Id. at 410-11.
Id. at 414.
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The ECJ stated that this intervention was particularly important when the
market was still highly influenced by the former state monopolistic structure.168 In Telefónica, the Commission went even further and stated that the
provision of the broadband services did not require significant new investment because “Telefónica’s infrastructure is to a large extent the fruit of
investments that were undertaken well before the advent of broadband in
Spain and that thus bore no relation to the provision of broadband services
(but for the provision of traditional fixed telephony services).”169 The cost
incurred to upgrade the network did not compare with the cost of building a
completely new upstream infrastructure.170 Prior knowledge of a duty to
supply would not have affected the investment decision.171
Even if this is true, it is difficult for an antitrust court to make this distinction (the requirement of significant new investment versus the development of existing ex-state funded infrastructure) in order to determine
intervention.
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[C]ompetitors are not so prejudiced with regard to their competitive opportunities in the
local network by the slight difference between retail and wholesale prices as to make it
economically impossible for them to enter the market successfully or even to remain in
the market. . . . [That difference] was not so significant as to deprive competitors of any
opportunity themselves to cross-subsidise their retail prices in order to be able to offer
176

177

178
179

180

181
182

Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 459 (2009) (citing Town of
Concord, Mass. v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (in Town of Concord,
both wholesale and retail prices were subject to regulation)).
Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, }
224 (Oct. 14, 2010).
Id. } 92.
The TKG states that wholesale “[r]ates shall be based on the costs of efficient service
provision.” Id. } 24(10).
Deutsche Telekom’s retail rates for analog and broadband, which consist of a basic monthly
charge and a one-off charge for a new connection, are regulated under a price cap system.
Prices for services were not regulated separately but were regulated within a basket
consisting of groupings of different services. A new system was introduced in 2002 with
differing baskets. Some prices for services within the basket were subject to prior
notification of price increases. ADSL charges were not subject to advance notification of
price changes.
Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 115.
Id. } 116.
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In linkLine, AT&T had been previously required by regulation to supply
the wholesale service. In his separate concurring judgment, Justice Breyer
stated that a price squeeze case should not be available to a purchaser from
a regulated firm when “a regulatory structure exists to deter and remedy
anti-competitive harm,” as “the costs of antitrust enforcement are likely to
be greater than the benefits.”176
In contrast, the ECJ in Deutsche Telekom found that, while the regulatory
framework applicable to the telecommunications sector was a relevant factor
in the application of Article 102 to the undertaking,177 it was not meant to
remove or diminish the role of competition law, “since the competition rules
laid down by the EC Treaty supplement in that regard, by an ex post review,
the legislative framework adopted by the Union legislature for ex ante regulation of the telecommunications markets.”178
Deutsche Telekom claimed that it could not be guilty of a margin squeeze
because its wholesale charges for local loop access had been approved by the
German telecommunications regulatory authority, Reg TP.179 Its retail rates
for analogue and broadband were also regulated under a price cap
system.180 Reg TP had even considered, on more than one occasion,
whether Deutsche Telekom’s pricing could amount to a margin squeeze.181
It found there was a negative spread between the wholesale and retail prices
but, unlike the Commission, declared that other operators could offer their
end users competitive prices by resorting to cross-subsidized charges for
access services and call charges.182 Thus, in its decision of April 29, 2003,
Reg TP found:
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their end-users connections at a price as attractive as that offered by the applicant, or
even at a lower price. That applies particularly to the higher-value and costlier ISDN and
ADSL connections, which have increased markedly in number on account of the significant expansion of internet penetration, as well as of the marketing of faster and better
access to the internet.183

anti-competitive conduct is required of undertakings by national legislation, or if the
latter creates a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity on their part . . . In such a situation, the restriction of competition is not attributable,
as those provisions implicitly require, to the autonomous conduct of the undertakings.187
183
184

185

186
187

Id. } 117.
Article 226 of the EC Treaty (now Article 258 of the TFEU); Deutsche Telekom, 2008
E.C.R. II-477, } 117.
Deutsche Telekom, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 269 (approved by the ECJ in Case C-280/08 P,
Deutsche Telekom AG v. Comm’n, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 67 (Oct. 14,
2010)). However, the Commission reduced the fine by 10 percent on this basis.
Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 67.
Id. } 80. Articles 101 and 102 may apply, however, “if it is found that the national
legislation leaves open the possibility of competition which may be prevented, restricted or
distorted by the autonomous conduct of undertakings.” Joined Cases C-359/95 P & C-379/
95 P, Commission & France v. Ladbroke Racing, 1997 E.C.R. I-6265, }} 33-34 (and the
cases cited therein). Cf. Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011
ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, } 49 (Feb. 17, 2011). There have been very few decisions that
have accepted that liability under the Treaty has been avoided by national legislation.
Deutsche Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 81; see Case 41/83, Italy v. Comm’n,
1985 E.C.R. 873, } 19; Joined Cases 240/82, 242/82, 261/82, 262/82, 268/82 & 269/82,
Stichting Sigarettenindustrie & Others v. Comm’n, 1985 E.C.R. 3831, }} 27-29; Case
C-198/01 Consorzio Industrie Fiammiferi (CIF) v. Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e
del Mercato, 2003 E.C.R. I-8055, }} 56, 67. The “Court has held that if a national law
merely encourages or makes it easier for undertakings to engage in autonomous
anti-competitive conduct, those undertakings remain subject to Articles [101] and [102
TFEU].” Id. } 82 (citing Joined Cases 40/73 to 48/73, 50/73, 54/73 to 56/73, 111/73, 113/
73 & 114/73, Suiker Unie & Others v. Comm’n, 1975 E.C.R. 1663, }} 36-73).
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Deutsche Telekom argued that the principle of legal certainty demanded
that they should be able to rely on the correctness of the national regulation
and that, instead of a competition law investigation under Article 102, an
action should be brought against Germany for failure to observe its obligations under the Treaty.184
The Commission found, however, that Deutsche Telekom had the scope
or autonomy to avoid the margin squeeze by adjusting the retail prices of its
narrowband access services to end users, while respecting the overall ceilings
for baskets of residential and business services. The German regulator’s
finding did not create a legitimate expectation that the charges were lawful
under Article 102,185 as Deutsche Telekom could not jettison its special responsibility under the Treaty not to distort competition.186
The ECJ pointed out that liability for an abuse could only be avoided
because it has been required by national regulation in the very limited circumstances, where
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188

189
190

191

The Commission applied a similar approach in Telefónica. Prior to liberalization of the
Spanish telecommunications market in 1998, Telefónica was a state-owned monopoly that
had been developed under exclusive rights and special concessions. After liberalization, it
became subject to a regulated duty to supply. Unlike the German regulator in Deutsche
Telekom, the Spanish regulator (CMT) had not ruled on the margin squeeze question, but
in any event, the Commission found that Telefónica had autonomous action available to it
to avoid the margin squeeze. Only 30 percent of the prices the Commission found subject
to a margin squeeze (amounting to one of the two upstream products) were also subject to
maximum prices set by the Spanish regulator, with the apparent implication that the
company could possibly have avoided liability by raising prices on the other 70 percent.
Telefónica, supra note 65, } 675.
Monti, supra note 126, at 127. Cf. Geradin & O’Donoghue, supra note 48, at 417-18.
Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Implementation of the Rules on Competition Laid Down
in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1; JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 100, at
116, 1031.
See Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. II-477, } 113; Deutsche
Telekom, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 227.
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It is difficult in practice, however, to apply the standards “required by national legislation” and “a legal framework which itself eliminates any possibility of competitive activity” to determine the relative spheres and limits of
expertise for national regulators (ex ante) versus the Commission (ex post) in
competition law decisions. Reasonable regulators can differ in their application of standards such as the “as efficient competitor,” especially when the
assessment is based on such uncertain facts as the imputed costs of the vertically integrated firm. Could, for example, a pricing decision made by a
sector specific regulator ( particularly when the possibility of a margin
squeeze has been considered) within the context of the EU regulatory framework, qualify as one made under “a legal framework which itself eliminates
any possibility of competitive activity”?188
In this case, for example, the German regulator applied the “as efficient
competitor” test to the margin squeeze issue but merely came to a different
conclusion based on a market-oriented approach. While the Commission is
not bound to adhere to the national regulatory decision, if reasonable minds
can differ on the determination of the economic issues, there should be
greater deference to the regulator, who has sector-specific knowledge, especially where the market is characterized by dynamic competition.
As Giorgio Monti points out, “applying EC competition law without any
regard to the regulatory framework is undesirable[,]”189 especially in the
context of the “modernization” of EU competition law, which increases the
role of the national competition authorities and national courts of the
member states.190 While national regulators are obliged to respect the provisions of the TFEU, they are also expected to apply national law, which may,
as regards telecommunications policy, have objectives that differ from those
of EU competition policy.191 These national objectives may also serve important public policy goals such as universal service provision.192 The more
appropriate remedy in these circumstances is an action against the National

The Diverging Approach to Price Squeezes

293

In any event, Telefónica’s ex ante incentive to invest in its infrastructure are not at stake
in the present case . . . those original investments were undertaken in a context where
Telefónica was benefiting from special or exclusive rights that shielded it from competition. The investment criteria used by the former monopoly at that time would have led
to the investment being made even if there would have been a duty to supply.195

This analysis introduces special duties for former state-owned enterprises, as
opposed to privately owned enterprises. The market power derived from the
special or exclusive rights would have already been reflected in the sale price
of the asset on privatization. It is not appropriate therefore to subject these
assets to special duties (beyond those conferred by regulation) on account of
historical ownership.196 If the assets are only partially privatized, it is also
192

193
194
195

196

For a discussion of, for example, the goal of security of energy supply versus competition
goals in national energy markets, see Monti, supra note 126, at 136-38.
Geradin & O’Donoghue, supra note 48, at 419.
Guidance on Article 102, supra note 5, } 82.
Telefónica, supra note 65, } 304. The ECJ in TeliaSonera noted that the “competitive
structure is also still highly influenced by the former monopolistic structure.” Case C-52/
09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, 2011 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 42, } 109
(Feb. 17, 2011); cf. Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C-109/03, KPN
Telecom BV/Onafhankelijke Post (Nov. 25, 2004); cf. Joined Cases C-544/03 & C-545/03,
Mobistar SA v. Commune de Fléron, 2005 E.C.R. I-7723, } 49.
A duty is already imposed by regulation on infrastructure assets with “significant market
power” by the liberalization framework. The ECJ clearly maintains that liberalization policy
is a relevant consideration for competition law because it found that the Commission was
entitled to characterize Deutsche Telekom’s margin squeeze as a serious offence which
strengthened “the barriers to entry to the recently liberalised markets.” Deutsche Telekom,
2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 882, } 275. Advocate General Jacobs in Bronner also indicated
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Regulatory Authority, as argued by Telefónica.193 As the Commission continues to intervene in this manner, we can expect more references to the
ECJ’s decisions, such as TeliaSonera, as state regulators and courts try to
grapple with the ensuing uncertainty.
As we have seen, on other occasions, the Commission and the courts
have taken account of issues within the sphere of national regulation. In
Deutsche Telekom, the Commission applied the regulatory tool of “rebalancing” to Deutsche Telekom’s retail prices but refused to take account of the
differing regulatory burdens imposed on the dominant undertaking due to
operator ( pre)selection and universal service when they applied the concept
of “equality of opportunity.” The Commission, in Telefónica and its Guidance
on Article 102,194 and the ECJ, in TeliaSonera, have also stated that if there is
a regulated duty to supply, there is no need to consider whether the margin
squeeze constitutes the abuse of a refusal to supply, because the relevant
questions about balancing the ex ante investment decisions and the promotion of competition in the downstream market have already been undertaken
by the regulatory authority.
In Telefónica, the Commission goes on to state:
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197

198

199

that state funding may result in an asset being indispensable on the basis of cost alone. The
cost of duplicating a facility might alone constitute an insuperable barrier to entry; “[t]hat
might be so particularly in cases in which the creation of the facility took place under
non-competitive conditions, for example, partly through public funding.” Case C-7/97,
Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. Mediaprint, 1998 E.C.R. I-7791, } 66 (AG Jacobs).
The requirement of a partially privatized firm to pursue the objective of profit maximization
also imposes a restraint on the otherwise greater incentive and ability of a fully state-owned
enterprise to engage in anticompetitive conduct, such as price predation, through recourse
to cross-subsidizations or by incurring non-recouped losses. See generally J. Gregory Sidak,
Acquisitions by Privatized Firms: The Case of Deutsche Telekom and VoiceStream, 54 FED.
COMM. L.J. 1 (2001); David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition Law for
State-Owned Enterprises, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 479 (2003).
Comments of Mazák, supra note 135, } 27. As we have seen, the ECJ in TeliaSonera and the
Commission in Telefónica invoked Article 102 to support their view that the Treaty does not
discriminate between mature and non-mature markets, yet they wish to apply a different
standard—which has no foundation in the Treaty—to former state monopolies as opposed
to private enterprises.
Telefónica, supra note 65, } 340; cf. id. } 348.
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not appropriate to confer more onerous duties and reduced profitability
(treasury and shareholder returns) on the “citizen/owners” as opposed to
“private-owners” of comparable assets.197 The risk imposed by these higher
duties will also considerably reduce the value of the assets on privatization.
As Advocate General Mazák pointed out in his Opinion in TeliaSonera, it is
not always easy to determine whether the source of funding was public or
private in origin. He argued that Article 102 does not provide a textual basis
for this distinction, and Article 345 of the TFEU does not permit discrimination between property rights along these lines.198
If this approach has validity, then, as Telefónica argued, it should also be
applied to its competitors in the market.199 The firms seeking wholesale
access to Telefónica’s services were generally not small startup enterprises in
need of special protection, but the subsidiaries of ex-state monopolies such
as France Telecom, developed under similar exclusive rights in other
European member states.
In order to avoid these apparent inconsistencies, the EU courts may be
advised to adopt the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court in Trinko of a
diminished role for antitrust in regulated industries. But this idea is not so
easily transferable to the historical and institutional context of the European
Union. Utility assets in the United States have traditionally been privately
owned, and the issue of bottleneck inputs in vertically integrated industries
is normally considered to be an exclusively regulatory matter. The EU telecommunications sector only began to undergo liberalization in the 1990s
after a period of predominately state ownership. In this context, the EU approach may therefore be more conducive to harmonization of law within the
member states, particularly after “modernization.” The supremacy of
Community Law and the duties imposed on member states to enforce the
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IV. CONCLUSION

This examination has identified significant differences in approach to the
regulation of a price or margin squeeze in U.S. and EU competition law. In
the United States after linkLine, the likelihood of a successful claim in this
area has been significantly diminished. This is true particularly where there
has been no prior course of voluntary dealing and no evidence of predatory
pricing at the downstream level. Price squeezes have traditionally been
treated as a form of a constructive refusal to deal, but the viability of the
refusal to deal cases, except possibly in very limited circumstances, has been
cast into doubt by the Supreme Court decisions in Aspen, Trinko, and
linkLine. It is also difficult after Trinko and linkLine to see how high wholesale prices could even be considered abusive and thereby amount to a constructive refusal to supply in the United States.
In contrast, the ECJ, as in its most recent pronouncement in TeliaSonera,
clearly views a margin squeeze as an independent form of abuse under
Article 102, where the violation can be identified purely on the assessment
of costs and prices. This decision significantly broadens the scope of potential liability for a margin squeeze in non-regulated industries in the
European Union. This legal position has the potential to distort ex ante upstream investment decisions and create a disincentive for the dominant
undertaking to supply the input in the first place. The failure to consider the
abuse within the elements of a constructive refusal to supply under Bronner
means that an exclusionary purpose would not be identified. Unlike in the
United States, there is no suggestion that there is a safe harbor under EU
law for a dominant firm that has never voluntarily sold at arm’s length in the
upstream market. Rather, there is a focus on the “as efficient competitor”
test as one of preserving “equality of opportunity” in narrowly construed
downstream markets. Faced with the uncertainty that this standard poses as
a theory of antitrust liability, in particular the imputation of costs of the
200

Telcel Declaration of Economists, supra note 12, at 10.
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Treaty differ in fundamentally distinct ways to the situation of the application of two federal statutes (the Sherman Act and the Telecommunications
Act of 1996) in Trinko. The harmonization of EU law and the liberalization
framework may be jeopardized if national interests, such as preserving a national champion, are prioritized by regulators (which may also be subject to
regulatory capture). Even so, however, if concerns regarding the efficacy of
the national regulation formed the basis of the EU margin squeeze decisions, the more appropriate remedy is an action against the National
Regulatory Authority rather than a competition law solution, which imposes
uncertain liability on dominant firms and creates an incentive to increase
retail prices, to the determinant of consumers.200

296

Journal of Competition Law & Economics

201
202

Sidak, supra note 12, n.69.
Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 5.
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vertically integrated firm, the dominant firm has an incentive to avoid liability by hypothesizing about its rivals’ costs and raising its retail price to the
level of the least-efficient retailer.
There are also significant differences in the U.S. and EU treatments of
this issue within regulated industries. In Trinko, the presence of a statutory
regime imposing a duty to deal did not create any new claims that went
beyond those arising under section 2. In the European Union, a regulated
duty to supply is equated to a finding of indispensability of the input under
Bronner. The regulator is assumed to have already determined the relevant
weighing of the ex ante investment decisions against the promotion of downstream competition. More problematic (because it has no foundation in the
Treaty) is the willingness in the European Union of the Commission and the
courts to make this assumption in liberalized markets, even in the absence
of a regulated duty to deal, when the dominant enterprise was developed
under special concessions and state investment. Competition law in the
European Union becomes a de facto tool for liberalization to promote new
entry in the EU telecommunications market. Sidak has argued that the need
to increase competition in previously state-owned or state-granted industries
may provide an explanation (or perhaps even justification) for the EU approach,201 but the TeliaSonera principle is not confined to these liberalized
markets. The likely outcome is that, while competition may be maintained
in the short term, the failure to consider this issue within the context of an
exclusionary purpose may be ultimately detrimental for consumer welfare.
The decision also continues to place significant distance between the position of the European courts and that of the Commission’s purported move
towards a “more economic” and “consumer welfare” interpretation of competition law more generally.
This significant extension of potential competition law liability for a
margin squeeze as a form of de facto regulation in the European Union, even
beyond that contemplated by Judge Learned Hand in Alcoa, cannot merely
be traced to differing histories and goals for competition law in the
European Union and the United States. The criticism expressed in the
Amicus Brief in linkLine may therefore have some justification. The
European Union may see “antitrust law [as] . . . simply one more tool of industrial policy, and thus its application may permissibly compromise consumer welfare to advance the welfare of competitors.”202 These differing
standards also no longer remain as merely conflicting approaches in distinct
jurisdictions but play out to increase uncertainty and risk for transnational
firms in global markets.

